Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
La Porta (2002)
de Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation The of http dx doi orgJournal Finance
Johnson (2000)
de Tunneling The http dx doi orgAmerican Economic Review
K. Gugler, Natalia Ivanova, J. Zechner (2014)
Ownership and control in Central and Eastern EuropeJournal of Corporate Finance, 26
Atanasov (2005)
How much value can blockholders tunnel ? Evidence from the Bulgarian mass privatization auctions of http dx doi orgJournal Financial Economics
Earle (2005)
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange : Do too many cooks spoil the goulash ? Corporate Governance : An http dx orgInternational Review, 13
Karl Lins (2002)
Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging MarketsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38
K. Wang, Gregory Shailer (2015)
Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets: A Meta‐AnalysisERN: Other Econometrics: Econometric Model Construction
(2009)
Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches
Ronald Anderson, D. Reeb (2003)
Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500Journal of Finance, 58
(2005)
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange : Do too many cooks spoil the goulash ?
René Stulz (1988)
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 20
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, Larry Lang (2002)
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large ShareholdingsJournal of Finance, 57
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (1998)
Corporate Ownership Around the WorldCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
Wagner
Xi meta - analysis of the financial performance of family firms : Another attempt of Strategy http dx orgJournal Family Business, 6
La Porta (1999)
de Corporate ownership around the world The of http dx doi orgJournal Finance
Petersen (2009)
Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets : Comparing approaches of http dx orgReview Financial Studies, 22
Estrin (2009)
The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies of http dx orgJournal Economic Literature, 47
Villalonga (2009)
How are firms controlled of http dx orgReview Financial Studies, 22
I. Filatotchev, Gregory Jackson, Chizu Nakajima (2013)
Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agendaAsia Pacific Journal of Management, 30
Dominik Wagner, J. Block, Danny Miller, Christian Schwens, Guoqian Xi (2015)
A Meta-Analysis of the Financial Performance of Family Firms: Another AttemptERPN: Other Family Business (Sub-Topic)
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate ValuationChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
Oskar Kowalewski, Oleksandr Talavera, Ivan Stetsyuk (2010)
Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From PolandFamily Business Review, 23
G. Vintilă, Ș. Gherghina, Mihai Nedelescu (2014)
The Effects of Ownership Concentration and Origin on Listed Firms’ Value: Empirical Evidence from RomaniaRomanian Journal of Economic Forecasting
R. Mclean (2005)
Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor ProtectionCfa Digest, 35
Boubakri (2005)
Postprivatization corporate governance : The role of ownership structure and investor protection of http dx orgJournal Financial Economics
V. Atanasov (2002)
How Much Value Can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian Mass Privatization AuctionsTuck Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1986)
Large Shareholders and Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 94
Belén Villalonga, R. Amit (2009)
How Are U.S. Family Firms ControlledReview of Financial Studies, 22
S. Estrin, J. Hanousek, Evžen Ko�?enda, Jan Svejnar (2009)
Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition EconomiesEntrepreneurship & Economics eJournal
Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine if the ownership structure of large Central Eastern-European companies, can influence the performance of the companies via better monitoring and control of managers done by individual blockholders. We use a sample of 497 large private and public CEE companies and analyze influence of large individual type of blockholders on performance over the period 2004-2013. We use ROA as a proxy for performance, firm, country characteristics and ownership indicators in a fixed-effect panel model. Our estimates indicate that only state and foreign ownership can influence performance while individual and widely held ownership do not influence performance in large CEE companies. On average, state controlled companies tend to underperform while foreign ownership seems to be beneficial for performance. This suggests that ownership can be used as a substitute for missing good governance institutions, in such a specific environment as CEE countries.
Scientific Annals of Economics and Business – de Gruyter
Published: Jun 1, 2016
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.