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/lp/de-gruyter/on-realistically-attacking-tor-with-website-fingerprinting-h6YkDZxetz
- Publisher
- de Gruyter
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2016 by the
- ISSN
- 2299-0984
- eISSN
- 2299-0984
- DOI
- 10.1515/popets-2016-0027
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract Website fingerprinting allows a local, passive observer monitoring a web-browsing client’s encrypted channel to determine her web activity. Previous attacks have shown that website fingerprinting could be a threat to anonymity networks such as Tor under laboratory conditions. However, there are significant differences between laboratory conditions and realistic conditions. First, in laboratory tests we collect the training data set together with the testing data set, so the training data set is fresh, but an attacker may not be able to maintain a fresh data set. Second, laboratory packet sequences correspond to a single page each, but for realistic packet sequences the split between pages is not obvious. Third, packet sequences may include background noise from other types of web traffic. These differences adversely affect website fingerprinting under realistic conditions. In this paper, we tackle these three problems to bridge the gap between laboratory and realistic conditions for website fingerprinting. We show that we can maintain a fresh training set with minimal resources. We demonstrate several classification-based techniques that allow us to split full packet sequences effectively into sequences corresponding to a single page each. We describe several new algorithms for tackling background noise. With our techniques, we are able to build the first website fingerprinting system that can operate directly on packet sequences collected in the wild.
Journal
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies – de Gruyter
Published: Oct 1, 2016