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Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels

Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels Abstract Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod’s research on iterative prisoner’s dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player- version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners’ dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some ‘nice’ strategies like ‘tit-for-tat’ are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some ‘nice’ conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analyse & Kritik de Gruyter

Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels

Analyse & Kritik , Volume 11 (2) – Nov 1, 1989

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the
ISSN
0171-5860
eISSN
2365-9858
DOI
10.1515/auk-1989-0202
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod’s research on iterative prisoner’s dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player- version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners’ dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some ‘nice’ strategies like ‘tit-for-tat’ are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some ‘nice’ conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups.

Journal

Analyse & Kritikde Gruyter

Published: Nov 1, 1989

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