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Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria

Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria Bruce L. Benson0 1. Introduction The potential for rapid expansion of large-scale in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and cyberspace is significantly constrained because these economies are low-trust societies. Therefore, recognizable rules for contracting backed by recourse in the form of third party dispute resolution and threatened sanctions to induce fulfillment of contractual promises may be necessary in order for a large-scale economy to emerge in these various settings. The question explored here is, how should rules for contracting, recourse, and sanctions be provided to facilitate the emergence of these markets. Many observers advocate state provision of contract law, but in fact, less state involvement in commercial law is actually called for at this stage of market development, rather than more. 1 This does not mean that commercial law is not required, Indeed, some who advocate less state involvement still see a role for · An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the Center for the Study of Emerging Institutions inaugural conference on Lex Cybernatoria: Voluntary Rule of Law in a Transnational Medium, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 14-18, 1998.1 wish to thank several of the participants (especially Jim Bennett, John Hasnas, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines de Gruyter

Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the
ISSN
2194-5799
eISSN
2153-1552
DOI
10.1515/jeeh-2000-0101
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Bruce L. Benson0 1. Introduction The potential for rapid expansion of large-scale in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and cyberspace is significantly constrained because these economies are low-trust societies. Therefore, recognizable rules for contracting backed by recourse in the form of third party dispute resolution and threatened sanctions to induce fulfillment of contractual promises may be necessary in order for a large-scale economy to emerge in these various settings. The question explored here is, how should rules for contracting, recourse, and sanctions be provided to facilitate the emergence of these markets. Many observers advocate state provision of contract law, but in fact, less state involvement in commercial law is actually called for at this stage of market development, rather than more. 1 This does not mean that commercial law is not required, Indeed, some who advocate less state involvement still see a role for · An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the Center for the Study of Emerging Institutions inaugural conference on Lex Cybernatoria: Voluntary Rule of Law in a Transnational Medium, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 14-18, 1998.1 wish to thank several of the participants (especially Jim Bennett, John Hasnas,

Journal

Journal des Économistes et des Études Humainesde Gruyter

Published: Mar 1, 2000

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