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Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos

Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos AbstractI discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phainomenon de Gruyter

Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos

Alves, Pedro M. S.
Phainomenon , Volume 25 (1): 27 – Oct 1, 2012
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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2012 Pedro M. S. Alves, published by Sciendo
eISSN
2183-0142
DOI
10.2478/phainomenon-2012-0014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractI discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.

Journal

Phainomenon – de Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2012

Keywords: Phenomenology ofLaw; Thetic acts; Norms; Ductive force

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