Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Jessica Moss, Plato’s Epistemology. Being & Seeming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, 272 p., ISBN 9780198867401 [hbk], £ 65.00

Jessica Moss, Plato’s Epistemology. Being & Seeming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, 272... Moss’ book is an enquiry concerning Plato’s concepts of epistēmē and doxa. The fundamental thesis of the book is that these two kinds of cognition are individuated and defined by their objects. These objects are, according to Moss, “what is” (ta onta) and “what seems” (ta dokounta), and they ultimately correspond to forms and perceptible things or events, respectively. One important implication of this interpretation is that epistēmē and doxa cannot be identified with the current notions of knowledge and belief because the latter notions are object-neutral, which means that they are not determined by any feature of the object they are about.Providing evidence for this overarching exegetical approach constitutes the goal of Moss’ book. Before discussing Moss’ main argument, I wish to point out what this book is not. Despite some similarities, cursorily mentioned by Moss, between some current epistemological debates and Plato’s theory of epistēmē, this book warns against reading Plato through modern epistemological concepts (not only ‘knowledge’, but also ‘understanding’ or ‘science’). Moss convincingly argues that the main reason for this is that Plato proceeds from certain metaphysical (reality is essentially hierarchical and multi-layered: one fundamental layer grounds the other) and ethical (epistēmē is essentially connected http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Rhizomata de Gruyter

Jessica Moss, Plato’s Epistemology. Being & Seeming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, 272 p., ISBN 9780198867401 [hbk], £ 65.00

Giovannetti, Lorenzo
Rhizomata , Volume 10 (1): 5 – Aug 1, 2022
Download PDF
5 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/jessica-moss-plato-s-epistemology-being-seeming-oxford-university-UMdaAr7Axv
Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
ISSN
2196-5110
eISSN
2196-5110
DOI
10.1515/rhiz-2022-0006
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Moss’ book is an enquiry concerning Plato’s concepts of epistēmē and doxa. The fundamental thesis of the book is that these two kinds of cognition are individuated and defined by their objects. These objects are, according to Moss, “what is” (ta onta) and “what seems” (ta dokounta), and they ultimately correspond to forms and perceptible things or events, respectively. One important implication of this interpretation is that epistēmē and doxa cannot be identified with the current notions of knowledge and belief because the latter notions are object-neutral, which means that they are not determined by any feature of the object they are about.Providing evidence for this overarching exegetical approach constitutes the goal of Moss’ book. Before discussing Moss’ main argument, I wish to point out what this book is not. Despite some similarities, cursorily mentioned by Moss, between some current epistemological debates and Plato’s theory of epistēmē, this book warns against reading Plato through modern epistemological concepts (not only ‘knowledge’, but also ‘understanding’ or ‘science’). Moss convincingly argues that the main reason for this is that Plato proceeds from certain metaphysical (reality is essentially hierarchical and multi-layered: one fundamental layer grounds the other) and ethical (epistēmē is essentially connected

Journal

Rhizomata – de Gruyter

Published: Aug 1, 2022

There are no references for this article.