Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
N. Xenos (1987)
IV. Liberalism and the Postulate of ScarcityPolitical Theory, 15
D. Hubin (1976)
Justice and future generations
M. Wissenburg (1998)
An extension of the Rawlsian savings principle to liberal theories of justice in general
E. Partridge (1976)
Rawls and the duty to posterity
S. Wall (2003)
Just Savings and the Difference PrinciplePhilosophical Studies, 116
J. English (1977)
Justice between generationsPhilosophical Studies, 31
F. Hubbard (1978)
Justice, Limits to Growth, and an Equilibrium State
Henry West (1993)
Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational ChoiceInternational Studies in Philosophy, 25
(2004)
Satisficing: Not Good Enough
A. Carter (2002)
Book Review: Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social JusticeEnvironmental Values, 11
Hubin (1976)
Justice and Future Generations in andPhilosophy Public Affairs, 6
(1978)
The Futurity Problem
(1974)
Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia
Simon (1955)
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice in of Is Rawlsian Justice Bad for the EnvironmentQuarterly Journal Economics
John Rawls (2018)
Political LiberalismJürgen Habermas
Mark Roojen (2004)
Satisficing and Maximizing: The Plausibility of Satisficing and the Role of Good in Ordinary Thought
W. Beckerman (1999)
Sustainable development and our obligations to future generations
Roger Paden (1997)
Rawls’s Just Savings Principle and the Sense of JusticeSocial Theory and Practice, 23
H. Simon (1955)
A Behavioral Model of Rational ChoiceQuarterly Journal of Economics, 69
Abstract In this paper I show that Rawls’s contract apparatus in A Theory of Justice depends on a particular presumption that is in conflict with the goal of conserving environmental resources. He presumes that parties in the original position want as many resources as possible. I challenge Rawls’s approach by introducing a rational alternative to maximising. The strategy of satisficing merely goes for what is good enough. However, it seems that under conditions of scarcity Rawls’s maximising strategy is the only rational alternative. I therefore scrutinise the common account of scarcity. I distinguish between absolute and relative scarcity in order to show that scarcity is influenced by our decisions. If we would not accept the claim to as much as possible without further legitimisation, like Rawls does, then scarcity might not be as severe a problem. Finally, I reject Rawls’s proposed solution for dealing with problems of sustainability, namely his idea of the just savings principle. I conclude that Rawlsian Justice as Fairness is bad for the environment.
Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter
Published: Nov 1, 2006
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.