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,In den Zeiten, wo das Wünschen noch geholfen hat’

,In den Zeiten, wo das Wünschen noch geholfen hat’ Abstract There is a widely accepted view in action theory (most prominently defended by Donald Davidson) according to which (1) actions are events, (2) reasons are intentional attitudes of the agent (pairs of beliefs and desires), and (3) acting for a reason entails that the reason rationalizes as well as causes the action. In the first part of my contribution I list seventeen difficulties for this standard account; in the second part I give an outline of how a more plausible conception of reasons and actions could look like. According to this conception, which is based on Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of a mechanistic understanding of psychological concepts, agency is due to a special kind of disposition of the agent, namely the disposition to behave as if the agent were permanently deliberating about what to do. The conception has surprising consequences for the ontological status of intentional attitudes and actions and for the relationship between action and responsibility. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analyse & Kritik de Gruyter

,In den Zeiten, wo das Wünschen noch geholfen hat’

Analyse & Kritik , Volume 24 (2) – Nov 1, 2002

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References (5)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by the
ISSN
0171-5860
eISSN
2365-9858
DOI
10.1515/auk-2002-0204
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract There is a widely accepted view in action theory (most prominently defended by Donald Davidson) according to which (1) actions are events, (2) reasons are intentional attitudes of the agent (pairs of beliefs and desires), and (3) acting for a reason entails that the reason rationalizes as well as causes the action. In the first part of my contribution I list seventeen difficulties for this standard account; in the second part I give an outline of how a more plausible conception of reasons and actions could look like. According to this conception, which is based on Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of a mechanistic understanding of psychological concepts, agency is due to a special kind of disposition of the agent, namely the disposition to behave as if the agent were permanently deliberating about what to do. The conception has surprising consequences for the ontological status of intentional attitudes and actions and for the relationship between action and responsibility.

Journal

Analyse & Kritikde Gruyter

Published: Nov 1, 2002

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