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Husserl e a fenomenologia heideggeriana da fenomenologia

Husserl e a fenomenologia heideggeriana da fenomenologia AbstractHeidegger’ s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriff offers what could be called a phenomenology of Phenomenology itself, that is: an investigation of its history. The husserlian discovery of the “categorial intuition” appears as the second moment of this history, after Brentano’s “intentionality” and before Heidegger’s own discovery of the “original sense of the a priori”, which constitutes the third moment. Our paper seeks to understand this sequence as a way to answer the leading question of how it may be possible that “to be a intentional object can have any relationship with the being itself”. Or, to put it in another formulation: how is intentionality itself ontologically possible? http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phainomenon de Gruyter

Husserl e a fenomenologia heideggeriana da fenomenologia

Borges-Duarte, Irene
Phainomenon , Volume 7 (1): 18 – Oct 1, 2003
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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2003 Irene Borges-Duarte, published by Sciendo
eISSN
2183-0142
DOI
10.2478/phainomenon-2003-0047
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractHeidegger’ s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriff offers what could be called a phenomenology of Phenomenology itself, that is: an investigation of its history. The husserlian discovery of the “categorial intuition” appears as the second moment of this history, after Brentano’s “intentionality” and before Heidegger’s own discovery of the “original sense of the a priori”, which constitutes the third moment. Our paper seeks to understand this sequence as a way to answer the leading question of how it may be possible that “to be a intentional object can have any relationship with the being itself”. Or, to put it in another formulation: how is intentionality itself ontologically possible?

Journal

Phainomenon – de Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2003

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