Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation

Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation Abstract This paper presents the results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD. The simulations are designed to enable uncooperative actors to exploit partners, leave them and find a new partner who knows nothing about their previous behavioral history. Hit-and-run exploitation should thrive under these conditions. However, as Schuessler (1989; 1990) has shown, the setting is highly unfavorable to uncooperative players. The present study extends this result to a wider set of strategies which can alternatively stay with defectors {and try to improve them) or leave them quickly. In addition, a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner. Still, a high amount of egoistical cooperation can persist in the present scenario. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analyse & Kritik de Gruyter

Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation

EdK-Group
Analyse & Kritik , Volume 22 (1) – May 1, 2000
Download PDF
16 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/exit-anonymity-and-the-chances-of-egoistical-cooperation-KGCISXUG6L

References (2)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the
ISSN
0171-5860
eISSN
2365-9858
DOI
10.1515/auk-2000-0106
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This paper presents the results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD. The simulations are designed to enable uncooperative actors to exploit partners, leave them and find a new partner who knows nothing about their previous behavioral history. Hit-and-run exploitation should thrive under these conditions. However, as Schuessler (1989; 1990) has shown, the setting is highly unfavorable to uncooperative players. The present study extends this result to a wider set of strategies which can alternatively stay with defectors {and try to improve them) or leave them quickly. In addition, a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner. Still, a high amount of egoistical cooperation can persist in the present scenario.

Journal

Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter

Published: May 1, 2000

There are no references for this article.