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Empirismo, conocimiento previo e inducción en Aristóteles, an. post. A 1

Empirismo, conocimiento previo e inducción en Aristóteles, an. post. A 1 AbstractI reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Elenchos de Gruyter

Empirismo, conocimiento previo e inducción en Aristóteles, an. post. A 1

Elenchos , Volume 31 (2): 42 – Jun 1, 2010

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
ISSN
0392-7342
eISSN
2037-7177
DOI
10.1515/elen-2010-310204
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractI reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation.

Journal

Elenchosde Gruyter

Published: Jun 1, 2010

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