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Abstract This essay argues that Rawls’s recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a “political not metaphysical” account which is also not “political in the wrong way”.
Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter
Published: May 1, 1992
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