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Circuit-extension handshakes for Tor achieving forward secrecy in a quantum world

Circuit-extension handshakes for Tor achieving forward secrecy in a quantum world Abstract We propose a circuit extension handshake for Tor that is forward secure against adversaries who gain quantum computing capabilities after session negotiation. In doing so, we refine the notion of an authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol and define pre-quantum, transitional, and post-quantum ACCE security. These new definitions reflect the types of adversaries that a protocol might be designed to resist. We prove that, with some small modifications, the currently deployed Tor circuit extension handshake, ntor, provides pre-quantum ACCE security. We then prove that our new protocol, when instantiated with a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, achieves the stronger notion of transitional ACCE security. Finally, we instantiate our protocol with NTRU-Encrypt and provide a performance comparison between ntor, our proposal, and the recent design of Ghosh and Kate. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies de Gruyter

Circuit-extension handshakes for Tor achieving forward secrecy in a quantum world

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by the
ISSN
2299-0984
eISSN
2299-0984
DOI
10.1515/popets-2016-0037
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract We propose a circuit extension handshake for Tor that is forward secure against adversaries who gain quantum computing capabilities after session negotiation. In doing so, we refine the notion of an authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol and define pre-quantum, transitional, and post-quantum ACCE security. These new definitions reflect the types of adversaries that a protocol might be designed to resist. We prove that, with some small modifications, the currently deployed Tor circuit extension handshake, ntor, provides pre-quantum ACCE security. We then prove that our new protocol, when instantiated with a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, achieves the stronger notion of transitional ACCE security. Finally, we instantiate our protocol with NTRU-Encrypt and provide a performance comparison between ntor, our proposal, and the recent design of Ghosh and Kate.

Journal

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologiesde Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2016

References