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/lp/de-gruyter/ber-grundlegende-voraussetzungen-fur-krisenstabilit-t-in-europa-ohne-7DRjyxaI9e
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- Publisher
- de Gruyter
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1987 by the
- ISSN
- 0171-5860
- eISSN
- 2365-9858
- DOI
- 10.1515/auk-1987-1-211
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract There are several reasons which suggest that the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe is gradually diminishing. Thus, Europeans are confronted with the question whether and under what conditions strategic stability can be obtained in a post-nuclear world. From the analysis of a simple conceptual model of military conflict the conclusion is reached that, in order to preserve crisis stability in a non-nuclear world and to dampen the arms race, the antagonistic land forces in Europe need to be gradually restructured in a manner so that neither side may perceive the other as a potential threat to its territorial integrity. The requisite structural changes ought to be brought about before nuclear weapons become altogether invailable for deterrence in Europe, otherwise the War saw Pact’s conventional superiority would, in a serious crisis, leave Western Europe only the choice between military defeat and a priori capitulation. There should be military as well as economic incentives for the implementation of structural changes toward a reduction of the offensive capabilities of conventional forces, if the so-called ‘defense efficiency hypothesis’ were to be validated. Otherwise, a deterioration of crisis stability must be expected during the transition period.
Journal
Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter
Published: May 1, 1987