Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Quervain, U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, Melanie Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, A. Buck, E. Fehr (2004)
The Neural Basis of Altruistic PunishmentScience, 305
N. Hayashi, E. Ostrom, James Walker, T. Yamagishi (1999)
RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROLRationality and Society, 11
Alvin Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, S. Zamir (1991)
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental StudyThe American Economic Review, 81
C. Holt (1995)
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research
D. Ellsberg (1961)
Decision, probability, and utility: Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms
K. Basu (1994)
The traveler's dilemma: Paradoxes of rationality in game theoryThe American Economic Review, 84
Joyce Berg, J. Dickhaut, K. McCabe (1995)
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social HistoryGames and Economic Behavior, 10
(1999)
N./E. Ostrom/J. Walker/T
Gary Bolton, Elena Katok, R. Zwick (1998)
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindnessInternational Journal of Game Theory, 27
M. Watabe, S. Terai, N. Hayashi, T. Yamagishi (1996)
Cooperation in the One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Based on Expectations of ReciprocityThe Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36
D. Matthews (1977)
Evolution and the Theory of Games
J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, Colin Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis (2004)
Foundations of Human Sociality - Economic Experiments and Ethnographic: Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies
E. Fehr, S. Gächter (1999)
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods ExperimentsBehavioral & Experimental Economics
B. Frey, Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997)
The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-OutThe American Economic Review, 87
J. Kagel, A. Roth (1997)
Handbook of Experimental Economics
D. Kahneman (2007)
Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) :
David Lewis (1986)
Convention: A Philosophical Study
H. Gintis (1976)
The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist ProductionReview of Radical Political Economics, 8
G. Kirchsteiger, E. Fehr, S. Gächter (1997)
Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidenceULB Institutional Repository
M. Ahlbrecht, M. Weber (1995)
Hyperbolic Discounting Models in Prescriptive Theory of Intertemporal ChoiceJournal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
R. Sugden (1993)
An Axiomatic Foundation for Regret TheoryJournal of Economic Theory, 60
J. Alcock (1975)
Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach
Christina Fong, S. Bowles, H. Gintis (2004)
Reciprocity and the Welfare StatePublic Economics eJournal
Camerer (2003)
Behavioral Game Theory : Experiments in Strategic Interaction Princeton NJ Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler s Dilemma ? inAmerican Economic Review, 89
(2004)
J.-F./U. Fischbacher/V. Treyer/M
J. Andreoni, John Miller (2002)
NOTES AND COMMENTS GIVING ACCORDING TO GARP: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE CONSISTENCY OF PREFERENCES FOR ALTRUISM
D. Levine (1998)
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in ExperimentsReview of Economic Dynamics, 1
G. Charness, M. Rabin (2001)
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PREFERENCES WITH SIMPLE TESTS
Charles Holt, Loren Langan, Anne Villamil (1986)
Market Power in Oral Double AuctionsEconomic Inquiry, 24
(1990)
A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton Kripke, S
B. Bernheim (1984)
Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorEconometrica, 52
D. Lindley, L. Savage (1955)
The Foundations of StatisticsThe Mathematical Gazette, 57
C. Capra, J. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, Charles Holt, Peter Coughlan, Rob Gilles, Susana Cabrera-Yeto, Irene Comeig, Nadège Marchand (1999)
Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?The American Economic Review, 89
R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey (1992)
An experimental study of the centipede gameEconometrica, 60
W. Hamilton (1970)
Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary ModelNature, 228
Ronald Fagin (1995)
Reasoning about knowledge
A. Kolmogorov, Nathan Morrison, A. Bharucha-Reid
Theory of ProbabilityNature, 124
Halpern (2001)
Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction in Games andEconomic Behavior, 37
Satoru Kudose (2007)
TRAVELER’S DILEMMA
T. Yamagishi (1986)
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public goodJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51
Saul Kripke (1959)
A completeness theorem in modal logicJournal of Symbolic Logic, 24
(1995)
Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research, Princeton -/L. Langan/A. Villamil (1986), Market Power in an Oral Double Auction
R. Nagel (1995)
Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental StudyThe American Economic Review, 85
Hamilton (1963)
The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior in American Natural - ist The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior II in Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model inJournal of Theoretical Biology Nature, 96
Lewis (1969)
Conventions : A Philosophical Study Cambridge / MA Choice under Uncertainty : Problems Solved and Unsolved inJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1
M. Allais (1953)
Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaineEconometrica, 21
Kagel (1995)
Handbook of Experimental Economics Princeton Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision Under Risk inEconometrica, 47
W. Redmond (2003)
Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of NeuroeconomicsJournal of Economic Issues, 37
Colin Camerer (2003)
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
T. Bewley (1999)
Why Wages Don't Fall during a Recession
Elchanan Ben-Porath (1997)
Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information GamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 64
R. Aumann, Adam Brandenburger (1995)
Epistemic Conditions for Nash EquilibriumEconometrica, 63
W. Güth, R. Schmittberger, Bernd Schwarze (1982)
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargainingJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3
B. Frey (1997)
A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues
P. Shizgal (1999)
On the neural computation of utility: implications from studies of brain stimulation reward
Gary Bolton, Axel Ockenfels (2000)
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and CompetitionThe American Economic Review, 90
Gary Bolton, R. Zwick (1995)
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum BargainingGames and Economic Behavior, 10
R. Aumann (1995)
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationalityGames and Economic Behavior, 8
D. Kahneman, A. Tversky (1979)
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk Econometrica 47
M. Machina (1987)
Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and UnsolvedJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1
(1991)
The Genetic and Cultural Origins of Cooperation
Uzi Segal (1987)
The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility ApproachInternational Economic Review, 28
Martin Brown, A. Falk, E. Fehr (2003)
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market InteractionsLaw & Economics: Private Law (Topic)
F. Hayek (2007)
The American Economic Review
Joseph Halpern (1998)
Substantive Rationality and Backward InductionMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
Jonathan Thomas, R. Evans (2001)
Cooperation and PunishmentGame Theory and Information
George Akerlof (1982)
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift ExchangeQuarterly Journal of Economics, 97
David Pearce (1984)
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of PerfectionEconometrica, 52
Ben (1997)
Rationality Nath Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect - Information Games in Trust Reciprocity and Social History inReview of Economic Studies Games and Economic Behavior, 64
W. Hamilton (1963)
The Evolution of Altruistic BehaviorThe American Naturalist, 97
W. Hamilton (1964)
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.Journal of theoretical biology, 7 1
(2005)
M./S. Bowles/H
C. Smith, John Neumann, O. Morgenstern (1945)
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.Journal of the American Statistical Association, 40
(1992)
535–568 Ainslie, G./N
A. Lerner (1972)
The Economics and Politics of Consumer SovereigntyThe American Economic Review, 62
Maynard Smith (1982)
Evolution and the Theory of Games Cambridge An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game inEconometrica, 60
Roth (1995)
Bargaining Experiments in eds The Handbook of Experimental Economics Princeton Bargaining and Mar - ket Behavior in Jerusalem Ljubljana Pittsburgh and Tokyo : An Experimental Study inAmerican Economic Review, 81
(1993)
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?
Ainslie (1992)
Hyperbolic Discounting in eds Choice Over Time New York Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange in Jour - nal ofQuarterly Economics, 97
David Laibson (1997)
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic DiscountingQuarterly Journal of Economics, 112
Alcock (1993)
Animal Behavior : An Evolutionary Approach Sunderland MA Le comportement de l homme rationnel devant le risque critique des postulats et axiomes de l e cole Ame ricaine inEconometrica, 21
S. Bowles, H. Gintis (1993)
The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political EconomyJournal of Economic Perspectives, 7
(2007)
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
Savage (1954)
The Foundations of Statistics New York The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion : An Anticipated Utility Approach in Re - examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games inInternational Economic Review International Journal of Game Theory, 28
Kreps (1990)
A Course in Microeconomic Theory Princeton A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic inJournal of Symbolic Logic, 24
Nagel (1995)
Unravelling in Guessing Games : An Experimental Study in Amer - icanEconomic Review, 85
Abstract It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties.
Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter
Published: May 1, 2005
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.