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The Pearl Harbor Raid Revisited Alvin D. C o o x San Diego State University The distinction between deterrence a n d incitement is a fine one. In May 1940, b y directing that the Pacific Fleet be based at "impregnable" Pearl H a r b o r r a t h e r t h a n o n the A m e r i c a n West Coast, P r e s i d e n t Franklin D. Roosevelt unwittingly sealed the fate of America's battle- ship force, the pride of the U.S. Navy. Long-range historical conse- quences were to prove even more decisive.' I A t that time, the key to Japanese naval thinking lay w i t h Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, w h o h a d taken c o m m a n d of the Combined Fleet late in A u g u s t 1939. His h a n d could be felt in n e w emphasis on air combat, training, u n o r t h o d o x conceptions of battle, a n d early deci- sions. Reacting to the presence of the Pacific Fleet
Journal of American-East Asian Relations – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1994
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