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The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy, 1969-1971 *

The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy,... The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 heralded a new approach wherein the United States sought to limit military commitments, particularly of ground forces, in Asia. This departure was seized on by Nakasone Yasuhiro as an opportunity to push for “autonomous defense” at the risk of undermining the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. For Premier Satō, however, the treaty was the cornerstone of Japan’s relationship with the United States and vital to the security of Japan and Northeast Asia. Such a divergence of views went to the heart of Japan’s security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, America would cajole and pressure Japan to assume more of the regional defense burden, while on the other, Japanese elites resisted such pressure due to fears of alienating and alarming both Japan’s neighbors and the Japanese public. The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone’s ideas on “autonomous defense” posed a major challenge to the postwar consensus on defense and Japan’s security ties to the United States. Ultimately, however, they were not able to undermine this consensus which lasted long after the end of the Cold War. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of American-East Asian Relations Brill

The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy, 1969-1971 *

Journal of American-East Asian Relations , Volume 19 (1): 52 – Jan 1, 2012

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2012 by Koninklijke Brill N.V., Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1058-3947
eISSN
1876-5610
DOI
10.1163/187656112X651308
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 heralded a new approach wherein the United States sought to limit military commitments, particularly of ground forces, in Asia. This departure was seized on by Nakasone Yasuhiro as an opportunity to push for “autonomous defense” at the risk of undermining the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. For Premier Satō, however, the treaty was the cornerstone of Japan’s relationship with the United States and vital to the security of Japan and Northeast Asia. Such a divergence of views went to the heart of Japan’s security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, America would cajole and pressure Japan to assume more of the regional defense burden, while on the other, Japanese elites resisted such pressure due to fears of alienating and alarming both Japan’s neighbors and the Japanese public. The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone’s ideas on “autonomous defense” posed a major challenge to the postwar consensus on defense and Japan’s security ties to the United States. Ultimately, however, they were not able to undermine this consensus which lasted long after the end of the Cold War.

Journal

Journal of American-East Asian RelationsBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2012

Keywords: Satō Eisaku; Nakasone Yasuhiro; Japanese defense policy; Nixon Doctrine; Nixon Shock; U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty; Japanese Defense Agency

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