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Power, responsibility, and accountability: Rethinking the legitimacy of institutions for climate finance

Power, responsibility, and accountability: Rethinking the legitimacy of institutions for climate... Climate Law 1 (2010) 261­312 DOI 10.3233/CL-2010-013 IOS Press Athena Ballesteros, Smita Nakhooda, Jacob Werksman and Kaija Hurlburt1 I. Introduction Reducing greenhouse gas emissions on a scale necessary to avert the worst impacts of climate change, while at the same time building resilience to these impacts, will require an unprecedented mobilization of public financial resources.2 A significant amount of these resources will need to be raised from public sources in developed countries, invested in developing countries, and be managed by one or more international institutions entrusted with a set of specific functions (see Table 1). The question of which international institutions--new, existing, or reformed--should carry out these functions has become central to the negotiations to reach a "global deal" on climate change. Negotiations are taking place in the context of the Bali Action Plan, a decision of the COP to the UNFCCC, and in the context of the Copenhagen Accord, a high-level political statement that Ballesteros (aballesteros@wri.org), Smita Nakhooda (snakhooda@wri.org), Jacob Werksman (JWerksman@wri.org), and Kaija Hurlburt are at the World Resources Institute. This article was developed from a WRI Working Paper of the same title published in December 2009, and has been updated to reflect more recent developments http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Climate Law Brill

Power, responsibility, and accountability: Rethinking the legitimacy of institutions for climate finance

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1878-6553
eISSN
1878-6561
DOI
10.1163/CL-2010-013
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Climate Law 1 (2010) 261­312 DOI 10.3233/CL-2010-013 IOS Press Athena Ballesteros, Smita Nakhooda, Jacob Werksman and Kaija Hurlburt1 I. Introduction Reducing greenhouse gas emissions on a scale necessary to avert the worst impacts of climate change, while at the same time building resilience to these impacts, will require an unprecedented mobilization of public financial resources.2 A significant amount of these resources will need to be raised from public sources in developed countries, invested in developing countries, and be managed by one or more international institutions entrusted with a set of specific functions (see Table 1). The question of which international institutions--new, existing, or reformed--should carry out these functions has become central to the negotiations to reach a "global deal" on climate change. Negotiations are taking place in the context of the Bali Action Plan, a decision of the COP to the UNFCCC, and in the context of the Copenhagen Accord, a high-level political statement that Ballesteros (aballesteros@wri.org), Smita Nakhooda (snakhooda@wri.org), Jacob Werksman (JWerksman@wri.org), and Kaija Hurlburt are at the World Resources Institute. This article was developed from a WRI Working Paper of the same title published in December 2009, and has been updated to reflect more recent developments

Journal

Climate Law – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2010

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