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Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. By Brian VanDeMark. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; xvi+268 pp. O n 27 July 1965, n o d s of a p p r o v a l by Lyndon Johnson's closest advisors confirmed his decision to "give the c o m m a n d e r s in Vietnam the m e n they requested" (p. 208). The h a r r i e d president h a d h e a r d impassioned appeals to " h o l d to the present course, w i t h o u t dramatic escalation" (p. 205). He ig- nored repeated w a r n i n g s that the United States could n o t w i n a w a r in South- eastAsia because he w o u l d n o t riskAmerican security or credibility b y pulling o u t of Vietnam. Johnson's decision to authorize a vast increase in American combat f o r c e s - f r o m 75,000 to 175,000 by the end of 1965, w i t h the
Journal of American-East Asian Relations – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1995
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