Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Double Subjects and Conventional Implicatures

Double Subjects and Conventional Implicatures <jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper considers the class of meaning that Grice (1975) referred to as conventional implicature (CI). There has been a great deal of discussion on this topic since the work of Potts (2005), and much new data has been brought to bear on the subject. However, in the midst of this new work, we have got away from Grice's original conception, and the fact that CIs as defined by Potts are different than what Grice originally intended is often overlooked. The dislocation construction known as a double-subject sentence (DSS), makes a nice test case for exploring the two conceptions of conventional implicature. I show that the DSS meets three of Potts' four CI criteria quite readily. Yet, Potts' criterion that CIs be speaker-oriented — which distinguishes them from Gricean CIs — is difficult to illustrate for the DSS. I then show that this criterion is empirically unsustainable and so should be abandoned. This leaves us with a system that is essentially Gricean, in which the DSS is given a straightforward account.</jats:p> </jats:sec> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Review of Pragmatics Brill

Double Subjects and Conventional Implicatures

Salmon, William
International Review of Pragmatics , Volume 1 (2): 249 – Jan 1, 2009
Download PDF
44 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/double-subjects-and-conventional-implicatures-7hARWZaWhX

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2009 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1877-3095
eISSN
1877-3109
DOI
10.1163/187730909X12535267111570
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper considers the class of meaning that Grice (1975) referred to as conventional implicature (CI). There has been a great deal of discussion on this topic since the work of Potts (2005), and much new data has been brought to bear on the subject. However, in the midst of this new work, we have got away from Grice's original conception, and the fact that CIs as defined by Potts are different than what Grice originally intended is often overlooked. The dislocation construction known as a double-subject sentence (DSS), makes a nice test case for exploring the two conceptions of conventional implicature. I show that the DSS meets three of Potts' four CI criteria quite readily. Yet, Potts' criterion that CIs be speaker-oriented — which distinguishes them from Gricean CIs — is difficult to illustrate for the DSS. I then show that this criterion is empirically unsustainable and so should be abandoned. This leaves us with a system that is essentially Gricean, in which the DSS is given a straightforward account.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Journal

International Review of Pragmatics – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2009

Keywords: POTTS; CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE; GRICE; DOUBLE SUBJECT; SPEAKER-ORIENTED

There are no references for this article.