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“Complacency or Complicity?: Reconsidering the un Command’s Role in Syngman Rhee’s Release of North Korean pows”

“Complacency or Complicity?: Reconsidering the un Command’s Role in Syngman Rhee’s Release of... Under cover of night, on 18 June 1953, South Korean President Syngman Rhee released nearly 25,000 “non-repatriate” North Korean prisoners of war (pows). The event occurred just as United Nations Command (unc), Chinese, and North Korean negotiators were preparing to sign a hard-fought armistice agreement at P’anmunjŏm that long had been delayed on the question of voluntary repatriation of pows. unc officials articulated an enduring tale of surprise and betrayal, one that persists in Korean War histories to this day. However, this article, after an examination of unc pow camp records, is able to look beyond their outrage to discover that the u.s. Army, in fact, formulated a deliberate strategy of restraint for a likely prisoner release. This plan grew out of unc Commander General Mark W. Clark’s sympathy for anti-Communist pows and a sense of anxiety regarding the future of u.s. relations with the Republic of Korea (rok). Although no evidence exists to support a claim that u.s. officials formally colluded with the rok government, the u.s. military played a complicit role in Rhee’s pow release. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of American-East Asian Relations Brill

“Complacency or Complicity?: Reconsidering the un Command’s Role in Syngman Rhee’s Release of North Korean pows”

Chae, Grace
Journal of American-East Asian Relations , Volume 24 (2-3): 32 – Sep 12, 2017
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1058-3947
eISSN
1876-5610
DOI
10.1163/18765610-02402008
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Under cover of night, on 18 June 1953, South Korean President Syngman Rhee released nearly 25,000 “non-repatriate” North Korean prisoners of war (pows). The event occurred just as United Nations Command (unc), Chinese, and North Korean negotiators were preparing to sign a hard-fought armistice agreement at P’anmunjŏm that long had been delayed on the question of voluntary repatriation of pows. unc officials articulated an enduring tale of surprise and betrayal, one that persists in Korean War histories to this day. However, this article, after an examination of unc pow camp records, is able to look beyond their outrage to discover that the u.s. Army, in fact, formulated a deliberate strategy of restraint for a likely prisoner release. This plan grew out of unc Commander General Mark W. Clark’s sympathy for anti-Communist pows and a sense of anxiety regarding the future of u.s. relations with the Republic of Korea (rok). Although no evidence exists to support a claim that u.s. officials formally colluded with the rok government, the u.s. military played a complicit role in Rhee’s pow release.

Journal

Journal of American-East Asian Relations – Brill

Published: Sep 12, 2017

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