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- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- eISSN
- 2213-4417
- DOI
- 10.1163/22134417-00361p02
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractWhat is dialectic and what is it for, in Aristotle? Aristotle’s answer in Topics 1.2 seems surprisingly lacking in unity. He seems to imply that insofar as dialectic is an expertise (τέχνη), it is a disposition to three (possibly four) different kinds of productive achievement. Insofar as dialectic is a method, it is one whose use is seemingly subject to multiple, differing standards of evaluation. The goal of the paper is to resist this problematic “multi-tool” view of Aristotelian dialectic, by explaining how dialectic’s contributions to training, encounters, and the philosophical sciences are of the same kind. What unifies them, I argue, is the kind of reasoning that improves the epistemic position of the person that engages with it. The kind of reasoning-based practices in which dialectic is the expertise are, at heart, tools of inquiry, tools for improving people’s understanding. This is why dialectic is beneficial for persuasive encounters: it is an expertise that enables its possessor to persuade by improving the understanding of their participants.
Journal
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill
Published: Nov 19, 2021