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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1-1/e≃ 0.632. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Association for Computing Machinery

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2023 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ISSN
2167-8375
eISSN
2167-8383
DOI
10.1145/3584864
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1-1/e≃ 0.632. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 24, 2023

Keywords: Sequential auctions

References

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