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Stochastic selfish routing

Stochastic selfish routing Stochastic Sel sh Routing EVDOKIA NIKOLOVA Texas A&M University and NICOLAS STIER-MOSES Columbia University We present a model for routing games in which edge delay functions are uncertain and users are risk-averse. We investigate how the uncertainty and risk-aversion transform the classical theory on routing games, including equilibria existence, characterization and price of anarchy. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences ”Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Routing games, Wardrop Equilibria, Uncertainty, Riskaversion, Mean-risk objective 1. INTRODUCTION Routing games were one of the central examples in the development of algorithmic game theory. In these games, multiple users need to route between di €erent sourcedestination pairs and edges are congestible, namely, each edge delay le (x) is a nondecreasing function of the ‚ow or number of users x on the edge. Many of the fundamental game theoretic questions are now well understood for these games, for example, does equilibrium exist, is it unique, can it be computed e ƒciently, does it have a compact representation; the same questions can be asked of the socially optimal solution that minimizes the total user delay. Furthermore, routing games were a primary motivation and http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2325713.2325717
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Stochastic Sel sh Routing EVDOKIA NIKOLOVA Texas A&M University and NICOLAS STIER-MOSES Columbia University We present a model for routing games in which edge delay functions are uncertain and users are risk-averse. We investigate how the uncertainty and risk-aversion transform the classical theory on routing games, including equilibria existence, characterization and price of anarchy. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences ”Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Routing games, Wardrop Equilibria, Uncertainty, Riskaversion, Mean-risk objective 1. INTRODUCTION Routing games were one of the central examples in the development of algorithmic game theory. In these games, multiple users need to route between di €erent sourcedestination pairs and edges are congestible, namely, each edge delay le (x) is a nondecreasing function of the ‚ow or number of users x on the edge. Many of the fundamental game theoretic questions are now well understood for these games, for example, does equilibrium exist, is it unique, can it be computed e ƒciently, does it have a compact representation; the same questions can be asked of the socially optimal solution that minimizes the total user delay. Furthermore, routing games were a primary motivation and

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2012

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