Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas, R. Servedio (2012)
A Robust Khintchine Inequality, and Algorithms for Computing Optimal Constants in Fourier Analysis and High-Dimensional GeometrySIAM J. Discret. Math., 30
Alex Gershkov, Jacob K Goeree, Alexey Kushnir, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi (2013)
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementationEconometrica, 81
Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff (2013)
Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow ApproachMicroeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal
G. M. Ziegler (1993)
Lectures on PolytopesSpringer.
L. Valiant (1979)
The Complexity of Enumeration and Reliability ProblemsSIAM J. Comput., 8
Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas, Rocco A. Servedio (2013)
A robust khintchine inequality, and algorithms for computing optimal constants in fourier analysis and high-dimensional geometryProceedings of the 40th International Colloquim on Automata
Yang Cai, C. Daskalakis, Matthew Weinberg (2012)
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Kim Border (1991)
IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCED FORM AUCTIONS: A GEOMETRIC APPROACHEconometrica, 59
I. Pitowsky (1994)
George Boole's ‘Conditions of Possible Experience’ and the Quantum PuzzleThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45
A. Schrijver (1986)
Theory of linear and integer programming
M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver (1988)
Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, 2nd editionSpringer.
Yang Cai, C. Daskalakis, S. Weinberg (2011)
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanismsElectron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., TR11
T. Roughgarden (2014)
Barriers to Near-Optimal Equilibria2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(2014)
Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun, and Mihalis Yannakakis
Steven Matthews (1984)
On the Implementability of Reduced Form AuctionsEconometrica, 52
Ryan O’Donnell, Rocco A. Servedio (2011)
The Chow parameters problemSIAM Journal of Computing, 40
C. Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos (2012)
The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism DesignArXiv, abs/1211.1703
Alexey Kushnir, Shuo Liu (2019)
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilitiesEconomic Theory, 67
R. O'Donnell, R. Servedio (2008)
The chow parameters problemProceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Kim Border (2007)
Reduced Form Auctions RevisitedEconomic Theory, 31
E. Maskin, J. Riley (1984)
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse BuyersEconometrica, 52
T. Sanders (2012)
ANALYSIS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
L. Cijan (1979)
A polynomial algorithm in linear programming
Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas, Vitaly Feldman, Rocco A. Servedio (2014)
Nearly optimal solutions for the Chow parameters problem and low-weight approximation of halfspacesJournal of the ACM, 61
E. Elkind (2007)
Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
R. Myerson (1981)
Optimal Auction DesignMath. Oper. Res., 6
Patrick Briest (2008)
Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
C. Papadimitriou, G. Pierrakos (2010)
On optimal single-item auctions
T. Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen (2015)
Why Prices Need AlgorithmsProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
X. Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun, M. Yannakakis (2013)
The Complexity of Optimal Multidimensional PricingArXiv, abs/1311.2138
R. O'Donnell (2014)
Analysis of Boolean FunctionsArXiv, abs/2105.10386
M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver (1988)
Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, 2
Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas, V. Feldman, R. Servedio (2012)
Nearly optimal solutions for the chow parameters problem and low-weight approximation of halfspacesArXiv, abs/1206.0985
Y.-K. Che, J. Kim, K. Mierendorff (2013)
Generalized reduced form auctions: A network flow approachEconometrica 81 (2013), 81
C. Chow (1961)
On the characterization of threshold functions
S. Hart, P. Reny (2011)
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterizationEconomic Theory Bulletin, 3
Konrad Mierendorff (2011)
Asymmetric reduced form AuctionsEconomics Letters, 110
S. Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian (2012)
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg (2010)
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
N. Nisan (2007)
Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
Border’s theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known generalizations of Border’s theorem either restrict attention to relatively simple settings or resort to approximation. This article identifies a complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class separations, that Border’s theorem cannot be extended significantly beyond the state of the art. We also identify a surprisingly tight connection between Myerson’s optimal auction theory, when applied to public project settings, and some fundamental results in the analysis of Boolean functions.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Nov 16, 2018
Keywords: Auctions
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.