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On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets

On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets RICCARDO COLINI-BALDESCHI and STEFANO LEONARDI, Sapienza University of Rome MONIKA HENZINGER and MARTIN STARNBERGER, University of Vienna, Faculty of Computer Science We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded. We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Clinching ascending http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Association for Computing Machinery

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References (24)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
2167-8375
DOI
10.1145/2818357
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets RICCARDO COLINI-BALDESCHI and STEFANO LEONARDI, Sapienza University of Rome MONIKA HENZINGER and MARTIN STARNBERGER, University of Vienna, Faculty of Computer Science We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded. We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Clinching ascending

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 7, 2015

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