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Mechanism design for dynamic settings

Mechanism design for dynamic settings Mechanism Design for Dynamic Settings RUGGIERO CAVALLO University of Pennsylvania We provide a brief summary of dynamic mechanism design: what it is, what purpose it serves, and some of the main results to date. We then describe work that applies the theory to an auction setting with deliberative agents and, brie ‚y, work that extends the theory to settings where the population of agents changes over time. We conclude with a discussion of directions for future research. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences ”Economics General Terms: Economics, Algorithms, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Dynamic mechanism design, VCG, Social welfare Mechanism design is the discipline of designing rules that lead to socially desirable outcomes in a context where individuals are sel sh and hold private information. Agents are asked to report their private information to a social planner, who selects an outcome and then makes payments carefully de ned so that each individual maximizes his utility by reporting truthfully. Mechanism design has historically focused almost exclusively on a static model, either where there is just a single decision to be made ( œone-shot  settings) or where all private information that will be http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Mechanism design for dynamic settings

ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 8 (2) – Dec 1, 2009

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1980522.1980529
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Mechanism Design for Dynamic Settings RUGGIERO CAVALLO University of Pennsylvania We provide a brief summary of dynamic mechanism design: what it is, what purpose it serves, and some of the main results to date. We then describe work that applies the theory to an auction setting with deliberative agents and, brie ‚y, work that extends the theory to settings where the population of agents changes over time. We conclude with a discussion of directions for future research. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences ”Economics General Terms: Economics, Algorithms, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Dynamic mechanism design, VCG, Social welfare Mechanism design is the discipline of designing rules that lead to socially desirable outcomes in a context where individuals are sel sh and hold private information. Agents are asked to report their private information to a social planner, who selects an outcome and then makes payments carefully de ned so that each individual maximizes his utility by reporting truthfully. Mechanism design has historically focused almost exclusively on a static model, either where there is just a single decision to be made ( œone-shot  settings) or where all private information that will be

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 1, 2009

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