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Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions

Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions Many different types of auctions can be applied to determine selling prices, each of them fulfilling different properties. Among them, Vickrey auctions are specially interesting due to the fact that they disallow strategic behaviors of the bidders. In fact, the dominant strategy for each bidder consists in bidding his reserve price. However, somebody has to collect all the bids, so that bids are not kept private. In this paper we present a method to overcome this problem. That is, we present a way to implement Vickrey auctions preserving the privacy of all the bidders. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1120694.1120696
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Many different types of auctions can be applied to determine selling prices, each of them fulfilling different properties. Among them, Vickrey auctions are specially interesting due to the fact that they disallow strategic behaviors of the bidders. In fact, the dominant strategy for each bidder consists in bidding his reserve price. However, somebody has to collect all the bids, so that bids are not kept private. In this paper we present a method to overcome this problem. That is, we present a way to implement Vickrey auctions preserving the privacy of all the bidders.

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jul 1, 2004

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