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Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games

Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games TOMASZ P. MICHALAK, University of Oxford and University of Warsaw ´ PIOTR L. SZCZEPANSKI, Warsaw University of Technology and Hewlett-Packard GD Poland TALAL RAHWAN, Masdar Institute of Science and Technology AGATA CHROBAK, University of Warsaw ^ SIMINA BRANZEI, Aarhus University MICHAEL WOOLDRIDGE, University of Oxford NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS, University of Southampton and King Abdulaziz University Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful abstraction for a number of realistic settings and economic situations, such as modeling relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the Shapley value have been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994] ´ ~ value and the Sanchez-Bergantinos [1997] value. In this context, the present article studies generalized characteristic function games from the point of view of implementation and computation. Specifically, the article makes two key contributions. First, building upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998], ´ we present a non-cooperative http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Association for Computing Machinery

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
2167-8375
DOI
10.1145/2665007
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games TOMASZ P. MICHALAK, University of Oxford and University of Warsaw ´ PIOTR L. SZCZEPANSKI, Warsaw University of Technology and Hewlett-Packard GD Poland TALAL RAHWAN, Masdar Institute of Science and Technology AGATA CHROBAK, University of Warsaw ^ SIMINA BRANZEI, Aarhus University MICHAEL WOOLDRIDGE, University of Oxford NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS, University of Southampton and King Abdulaziz University Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful abstraction for a number of realistic settings and economic situations, such as modeling relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the Shapley value have been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994] ´ ~ value and the Sanchez-Bergantinos [1997] value. In this context, the present article studies generalized characteristic function games from the point of view of implementation and computation. Specifically, the article makes two key contributions. First, building upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998], ´ we present a non-cooperative

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Oct 28, 2014

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