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Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices

Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for selecting any fixed number k of agents are severely limited and cannot extract a constant fraction of the nominations of the k most highly nominated agents. We prove here that this impossibility result can be circumvented by allowing the mechanism to sometimes but not always select fewer than k agents. This added flexibility also improves the performance of randomized mechanisms, for which we show a separation between mechanisms that make exactly two or up to two choices and give upper and lower bounds for mechanisms allowed more than two choices. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Association for Computing Machinery

Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices

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References (22)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 ACM
ISSN
2167-8375
eISSN
2167-8383
DOI
10.1145/3107922
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for selecting any fixed number k of agents are severely limited and cannot extract a constant fraction of the nominations of the k most highly nominated agents. We prove here that this impossibility result can be circumvented by allowing the mechanism to sometimes but not always select fewer than k agents. This added flexibility also improves the performance of randomized mechanisms, for which we show a separation between mechanisms that make exactly two or up to two choices and give upper and lower bounds for mechanisms allowed more than two choices.

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 22, 2017

Keywords: Mechanism design

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