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Election manipulation: the average case

Election manipulation: the average case Election Manipulation: The Average Case ELCHANAN MOSSEL University of California, Berkeley and Weizmann Institute of Science and ´ ´ MIKLOS Z. RACZ University of California, Berkeley We review recent research on quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which analyze the average-case manipulability of elections. The main message of these results is that computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely. We conclude with open problems. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Voting, computational social choice, manipulation, GibbardSatterthwaite, average-case 1. INTRODUCTION A naturally desirable property of a voting system is strategyproofness (a.k.a. nonmanipulability): no voter should benefit from voting strategically, i.e., voting not according to her true preferences. However, the classical result of Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite [1975] says that no reasonable voting system can be strategyproof: if voters rank three or more alternatives and all of them can be elected, then the only strategyproof voting systems are dictatorships. This has contributed to the realization that it is unlikely to expect truthfulness in voting. But is there a way of circumventing the negative results? What is the extent of manipulability of voting systems? This problem is increasingly http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Election manipulation: the average case

Mossel, Elchanan; Rácz, Miklós Z.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 11 (2) – Dec 1, 2012
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References (15)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2509002.2509007
Publisher site
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Abstract

Election Manipulation: The Average Case ELCHANAN MOSSEL University of California, Berkeley and Weizmann Institute of Science and ´ ´ MIKLOS Z. RACZ University of California, Berkeley We review recent research on quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which analyze the average-case manipulability of elections. The main message of these results is that computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely. We conclude with open problems. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Voting, computational social choice, manipulation, GibbardSatterthwaite, average-case 1. INTRODUCTION A naturally desirable property of a voting system is strategyproofness (a.k.a. nonmanipulability): no voter should benefit from voting strategically, i.e., voting not according to her true preferences. However, the classical result of Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite [1975] says that no reasonable voting system can be strategyproof: if voters rank three or more alternatives and all of them can be elected, then the only strategyproof voting systems are dictatorships. This has contributed to the realization that it is unlikely to expect truthfulness in voting. But is there a way of circumventing the negative results? What is the extent of manipulability of voting systems? This problem is increasingly

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 1, 2012

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