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Economies with complex property rights

Economies with complex property rights We discuss the exclusion core, a solution concept for object-allocation and object-exchange problems. The exclusion core is based on the right of exclusion and is especially useful for the analysis of economies with complicated property arrangements, such as those with shared ownership. The exclusion core coincides with the (strong) core in classic settings, and is closely related to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles algorithm. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Economies with complex property rights

Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 19 (1): 15 – Jul 16, 2021
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s)
ISSN
1551-9031
eISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/3476436.3476443
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We discuss the exclusion core, a solution concept for object-allocation and object-exchange problems. The exclusion core is based on the right of exclusion and is especially useful for the analysis of economies with complicated property arrangements, such as those with shared ownership. The exclusion core coincides with the (strong) core in classic settings, and is closely related to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles algorithm.

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jul 16, 2021

Keywords: cooperative games

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