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Design comparisons for procurement systems

Design comparisons for procurement systems We use experimental techniques to compare first-price auctions to a common but previously unexamined exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations." Initially, we find that transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions with four sellers, but that prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions with two sellers. Surprisingly, we find in two-seller environments that a history of multilateral negotiations leads to higher auction prices, which suggests that buyers may see little price effect by moving from negotiations to auctions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Design comparisons for procurement systems

ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 1 (1) – Jun 1, 2000

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/844302.844306
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We use experimental techniques to compare first-price auctions to a common but previously unexamined exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations." Initially, we find that transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions with four sellers, but that prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions with two sellers. Surprisingly, we find in two-seller environments that a history of multilateral negotiations leads to higher auction prices, which suggests that buyers may see little price effect by moving from negotiations to auctions.

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2000

References