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Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games IOANNIS CARAGIANNIS University of Patras & CTI, Greece and ANGELO FANELLI Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and NICK GRAVIN Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and ALEXANDER SKOPALIK TU Dortmund, Germany Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payo €. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even in games where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed, their computation can be a computationally hard task. Such negative results signi cantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players. Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which characterize situations where no player can signi cantly improve her payo € by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution concepts provided that they exist and can be computed e ƒciently. In this letter, we discuss recent positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2325713.2325718
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games IOANNIS CARAGIANNIS University of Patras & CTI, Greece and ANGELO FANELLI Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and NICK GRAVIN Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and ALEXANDER SKOPALIK TU Dortmund, Germany Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payo €. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even in games where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed, their computation can be a computationally hard task. Such negative results signi cantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players. Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which characterize situations where no player can signi cantly improve her payo € by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution concepts provided that they exist and can be computed e ƒciently. In this letter, we discuss recent positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2012

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