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Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship

Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship Computational Aspects of Random Serial Dictatorship HARIS AZIZ NICTA and UNSW and FELIX BRANDT Technische Universit¨t M¨nchen a u and MARKUS BRILL Duke University and ´ JULIAN MESTRE University of Sydney Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dictatorship is a well-established mechanism that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. We present an overview of recent results on the computational complexity of problems related to random serial dictatorship. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences--Economics General Terms: Theory, Algorithms, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Game Theory, Solutions Concepts, Pareto Optimality, Computational Complexity 1. INTRODUCTION Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In the voting setting, agents express preferences over alternatives and a social decision scheme returns a probability distribution over the alternatives based on the agents' preferences [Gibbard, 1977]. In the assignment setting, agents express preferences over objects, usually called houses because only one object is assigned to each agent, and a random assignment rule returns a random assignment of the houses specifying the probability with http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2728732.2728735
Publisher site
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Abstract

Computational Aspects of Random Serial Dictatorship HARIS AZIZ NICTA and UNSW and FELIX BRANDT Technische Universit¨t M¨nchen a u and MARKUS BRILL Duke University and ´ JULIAN MESTRE University of Sydney Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dictatorship is a well-established mechanism that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. We present an overview of recent results on the computational complexity of problems related to random serial dictatorship. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences--Economics General Terms: Theory, Algorithms, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Game Theory, Solutions Concepts, Pareto Optimality, Computational Complexity 1. INTRODUCTION Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In the voting setting, agents express preferences over alternatives and a social decision scheme returns a probability distribution over the alternatives based on the agents' preferences [Gibbard, 1977]. In the assignment setting, agents express preferences over objects, usually called houses because only one object is assigned to each agent, and a random assignment rule returns a random assignment of the houses specifying the probability with

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ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jan 28, 2015

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