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Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Association for Computing Machinery

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References (32)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 ACM
ISSN
2167-8375
eISSN
2167-8383
DOI
10.1145/3133242
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 14, 2017

Keywords: Algorithmic game theory

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