Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions

Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions Competitive Equilibrium in Two Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions SAEED ALAEI University of Maryland, College Park and KAMAL JAIN Mircosoft Research, Redmond and AZARAKHSH MALEKIAN Northwestern University Two sided matching markets are among the most studied models in market design. There is a vast literature on the structure of competitive equilibria in these markets, yet most of it is focused on quasilinear settings. General (non-quasilinear) utilities can, for instance, model smooth budget constraints as a special case. Due to the di ƒculty of dealing with arbitrary non-quasilinear utilities, most of the existing work on non-quasilinear utilities is limited to the special case of hard budget constraints in which the utility of each agent is quasilinear as long as her payment is within her budget limit and is negative in nity otherwise. Most of the work on competitive equilibria with hard budget constraints rely on some form of ascending auction. For general non-quasilinear utilities, such ascending auctions may not even converge in nite time. As such, almost all of the existing work on general non-quasilinear utilities have resorted to non-constructive proofs based on xed point theorems or discretization. We present the rst direct characterization of competitive equilibria http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions

Loading next page...
 
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/competitive-equilibrium-in-two-sided-matching-markets-with-general-M1a00t2i4p

References (30)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1998549.1998556
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Competitive Equilibrium in Two Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions SAEED ALAEI University of Maryland, College Park and KAMAL JAIN Mircosoft Research, Redmond and AZARAKHSH MALEKIAN Northwestern University Two sided matching markets are among the most studied models in market design. There is a vast literature on the structure of competitive equilibria in these markets, yet most of it is focused on quasilinear settings. General (non-quasilinear) utilities can, for instance, model smooth budget constraints as a special case. Due to the di ƒculty of dealing with arbitrary non-quasilinear utilities, most of the existing work on non-quasilinear utilities is limited to the special case of hard budget constraints in which the utility of each agent is quasilinear as long as her payment is within her budget limit and is negative in nity otherwise. Most of the work on competitive equilibria with hard budget constraints rely on some form of ascending auction. For general non-quasilinear utilities, such ascending auctions may not even converge in nite time. As such, almost all of the existing work on general non-quasilinear utilities have resorted to non-constructive proofs based on xed point theorems or discretization. We present the rst direct characterization of competitive equilibria

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2011

There are no references for this article.