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Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces

Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces Mechanism design studies the implementation of allocation functions (sometimes called social choice functions) when relevant information resides with self-interested agents who may misreport their information if it is rational to do so. A central question in the field is to characterize which allocation functions are truthful, meaning that they can be combined with a payment function that induces players to report their preferences truthfully. Characterization theorems for truthful mechanisms, when they exist, are a boon to the mechanism designer since they allow us to reduce problems of optimal mechanism design to algorithm design problems in which the algorithm that computes the allocation function is required to satisfy additional constraints. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces

ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 7 (3) – Nov 1, 2008

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1486877.1486882
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Mechanism design studies the implementation of allocation functions (sometimes called social choice functions) when relevant information resides with self-interested agents who may misreport their information if it is rational to do so. A central question in the field is to characterize which allocation functions are truthful, meaning that they can be combined with a payment function that induces players to report their preferences truthfully. Characterization theorems for truthful mechanisms, when they exist, are a boon to the mechanism designer since they allow us to reduce problems of optimal mechanism design to algorithm design problems in which the algorithm that computes the allocation function is required to satisfy additional constraints.

Journal

ACM SIGecom ExchangesAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Nov 1, 2008

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