Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits

Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING, Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER and MARTIN STARNBERGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences-- Economics; F.2.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity-- Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Algorithmic game theory, auction theory, clinching auction, Pareto optimality, budget limits ACM Reference Format: ¨ Paul Dutting, Monika Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. 2015. Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 4, 1, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Association for Computing Machinery

Loading next page...
 
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/auctions-for-heterogeneous-items-and-budget-limits-qL8WlUYnQa

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
2167-8375
DOI
10.1145/2818351
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING, Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER and MARTIN STARNBERGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences-- Economics; F.2.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity-- Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Algorithmic game theory, auction theory, clinching auction, Pareto optimality, budget limits ACM Reference Format: ¨ Paul Dutting, Monika Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. 2015. Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 4, 1,

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 7, 2015

There are no references for this article.