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An Economic View of Prophet Inequalities BRENDAN LUCIER Microsoft Research Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stopping. This survey provides an overview of this literature, covering extensions and applications of the prophet inequality through the lens of an economic proof of this classic result. We focus on highlighting ways in which the economic perspective drives new advances in the theory of online stochastic optimization, and vice versa. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Science]: Economics General Terms: Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Prophet Inequalities, Pricing, Approximation 1. OVERVIEW We are tasked with dividing up and selling a pool of resources among rational applicants, and our goal is to make the allocation as e cient (or, perhaps, as pro table) as possible. To what extent are optimal mechanisms approximated by simple sales protocols? This question stands at the forefront of algorithmic mechanism design, despite a lack of consensus on precisely what is meant by simple. While it s admittedly di cult to move past I ll know it when I see it, a
ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Sep 25, 2017
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