Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
A Cooperative Approach to Collusion in Auctions YORAM BACHRACH, Microsoft Research and MORTEZA ZADIMOGHADDAM, MIT and PETER KEY, Microsoft Research The elegant Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism is well-known for the strong properties it o ers: dominant truth-revealing strategies, e ciency and weak budget-balance in quite general settings. Despite this, it su ers from several drawbacks, prominently susceptibility to collusion. By jointly setting their bids, colluders may increase their utility by achieving lower prices for their items. The colluders can use monetary transfers to share this utility, but they must reach an agreement regarding their actions. We analyze the agreements that are likely to arise through a cooperative game theoretic approach, transforming the auction setting into a cooperative game. We examine both the setting of a multi-unit auction as well as path procurement auctions. Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Arti cial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti cial Intelligence Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Theory, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Collusion, Cooperative Game Theory, Bid Rigging 1. INTRODUCTION Auctions are a commonly used mechanism for selling or allocating goods. A key problem that such mechanisms face is that bidders may not bid
ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Mar 1, 2011
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.