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A competitive strategy for routing flow over time

A competitive strategy for routing flow over time A Competitive Strategy for Routing Flow over Time UMANG BHASKAR Dartmouth College and LISA FLEISCHER Dartmouth College and ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Network routing games are used to understand the impact of individual users ™ decisions on network e ƒciency. Prior work on routing games uses a simpli ed model of network ‚ow where all ‚ow exists simultaneously. In our work, we examine routing games in a ‚ow-over-time model. We show that by reducing network capacity judiciously, the network owner can ensure that the equilibrium is no worse than a small constant times the optimal in the original network, for two natural measures of optimality. These are the rst upper bounds on the price of anarchy in the ‚ow-over-time model for general networks. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: routing games, price of anarchy, ‚ow-over-time 1. INTRODUCTION We are interested in understanding the behavior of tra ƒc in large networks, such as the Internet and road networks. There are two common features of tra ƒc in these networks. (1) Tra ƒc travels over time. Thus, the state of these networks is a function http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

A competitive strategy for routing flow over time

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References (8)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1998549.1998554
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A Competitive Strategy for Routing Flow over Time UMANG BHASKAR Dartmouth College and LISA FLEISCHER Dartmouth College and ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Network routing games are used to understand the impact of individual users ™ decisions on network e ƒciency. Prior work on routing games uses a simpli ed model of network ‚ow where all ‚ow exists simultaneously. In our work, we examine routing games in a ‚ow-over-time model. We show that by reducing network capacity judiciously, the network owner can ensure that the equilibrium is no worse than a small constant times the optimal in the original network, for two natural measures of optimality. These are the rst upper bounds on the price of anarchy in the ‚ow-over-time model for general networks. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: routing games, price of anarchy, ‚ow-over-time 1. INTRODUCTION We are interested in understanding the behavior of tra ƒc in large networks, such as the Internet and road networks. There are two common features of tra ƒc in these networks. (1) Tra ƒc travels over time. Thus, the state of these networks is a function

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ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2011

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