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Decision Theory and Standards of Proof

Decision Theory and Standards of Proof Law and'Human Behavior. Vol. 5, No, 1, 1981 Case/Comment Claims of the usefulness of decision theory as a social tool are broad and diverse; so is skepticism of those claims. Interesting discussions are taking place concerning the role of decision theory and probability calculus in the law. Some argue that such procedures could be profitably applied to legal decisions within the fact-finding process, or to the analysis of structural foundations of legal procedures in general? Others contend that such techniques are more misleading than helpful--and even that mathematical precision is incompatible with crucial values embodied by our legal system? The dispute is well illustrated by the articles of Professor John Kaplan ~ and Professor Lawrence Tribe ~ concerning the use of mathematical techniques to for- mulate standards of proof necessary for the return of a jury verdict. This article will first focus on Kaplan's decision theoretic model of the trial process offered as a method to determine the probability function necessary to return a given verdict. This will be followed by a description of Tribe's counterargument to Kaplan's proposal The article will then critique both proposals in an attempt to reconcile the differing positions. KAPLAN'S MODEL 5 This is http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Law and Human Behavior American Psychological Association

Decision Theory and Standards of Proof

Milanich, Patricia G.
Law and Human Behavior , Volume 5 (1): 10 – Mar 1, 1981
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Publisher
American Psychological Association
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 American Psychological Association
ISSN
0147-7307
eISSN
1573-661X
DOI
10.1007/BF01048574
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Law and'Human Behavior. Vol. 5, No, 1, 1981 Case/Comment Claims of the usefulness of decision theory as a social tool are broad and diverse; so is skepticism of those claims. Interesting discussions are taking place concerning the role of decision theory and probability calculus in the law. Some argue that such procedures could be profitably applied to legal decisions within the fact-finding process, or to the analysis of structural foundations of legal procedures in general? Others contend that such techniques are more misleading than helpful--and even that mathematical precision is incompatible with crucial values embodied by our legal system? The dispute is well illustrated by the articles of Professor John Kaplan ~ and Professor Lawrence Tribe ~ concerning the use of mathematical techniques to for- mulate standards of proof necessary for the return of a jury verdict. This article will first focus on Kaplan's decision theoretic model of the trial process offered as a method to determine the probability function necessary to return a given verdict. This will be followed by a description of Tribe's counterargument to Kaplan's proposal The article will then critique both proposals in an attempt to reconcile the differing positions. KAPLAN'S MODEL 5 This is

Journal

Law and Human Behavior – American Psychological Association

Published: Mar 1, 1981

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