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Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching†

Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching† AbstractMembers of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus of reputation and the voting decisions, and can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected. (JEL D71, D72) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal Microeconomics American Economic Association

Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20180299
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractMembers of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus of reputation and the voting decisions, and can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected. (JEL D71, D72)

Journal

American Economic Journal Microeconomics – American Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2020

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