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Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution †

Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution † Abstract I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low. (JEL C78, D63, D71, D72, H41 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution †

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7685
eISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20140240
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low. (JEL C78, D63, D71, D72, H41 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2016

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