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Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences†

Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences† AbstractIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market. (JEL C78, I23, J41, J44) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.20170115
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market. (JEL C78, I23, J41, J44)

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2019

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