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Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match†

Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match† AbstractMost doctors in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) match with one of their most preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse. It casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value. (JEL C78, I11, I18, J44) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review: Insights American Economic Association

Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match†

American Economic Review: Insights , Volume 4 (2) – Jun 1, 2022

Abstract

AbstractMost doctors in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) match with one of their most preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse. It casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value. (JEL C78, I11, I18, J44)

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 © American Economic Association
ISSN
2640-205X
eISSN
2640-2068
DOI
10.1257/aeri.20200800
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractMost doctors in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) match with one of their most preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse. It casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value. (JEL C78, I11, I18, J44)

Journal

American Economic Review: InsightsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Jun 1, 2022

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