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The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early †

The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early † Abstract Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting). (JEL D72 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early †

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7685
eISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.6.4.162
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting). (JEL D72 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2014

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