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Strategic Private Experimentation †

Strategic Private Experimentation † Abstract We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high. (JEL D82, D83 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Association

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1945-7685
eISSN
1945-7685
DOI
10.1257/mic.6.4.74
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high. (JEL D82, D83 )

Journal

American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Nov 1, 2014

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