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Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result†

Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result† AbstractWe consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review: Insights American Economic Association

Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result†

Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result†

American Economic Review: Insights , Volume 4 (1) – Mar 1, 2022

Abstract

AbstractWe consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)

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References (33)

Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 © American Economic Association
ISSN
2640-205X
eISSN
2640-2068
DOI
10.1257/aeri.20210007
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)

Journal

American Economic Review: InsightsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Mar 1, 2022

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